The definition or difference between a merger and acquisition is contended but there seems general accord mergers are takeovers of relatively equal firms to asset levels whether of the same corporate output or even dissimilar ones. Acquisitions involve a parent company buying out ownership rights for profit or other control of a smaller company by asset volume that can be vastly different from the owner. The key concern is control of the subsidiary usually a private stock or internal working group and not necessarily total asset source funding of it. Beyond profits tax issues and legal liability are concerns if the ownership rights.

Following that bill regional banks had real difficulty getting or retaining assets then held by larger ones. Fund access and management shifted from regional discretion and consumers demand to restricted and limited access following the 2008 alleged financial crisis and restrictive or channeling control bills as the Dodd Frank Act institutionalized the costs. An awkward corporate phenomenon of consolidated ownership also appeared within a vague New York banker brokered framework. A series of takeovers or mergers led to cartel or price and output controls never previously experienced to levels.

The result was a 'hedge fund' control group that while not directly regulated by conventional government agencies as the Federal Trade or the Securities and Exchange Commission dominated the nation and world economy with control restrictions that seem closer to commodity price fixing as an OPEC gone high tech. The hedge funds involved most large enterprises toward the end of their lofty rein with asset controls well over $3 trillion to the Americas alone. They integrated often-dissimilar goods or services bound by trade pacts but seemed to guarantee a fixed income of owners or control interests with 2% annual return sought as given.

The problem with that arrangement as to even in the limited 10 year timeframe of its effective range it seemed enforceable restrictions were often so random or otherwise arbitrary internal pressures led to production loss by attrition or sometimes even design. New owners couldn't run them so tried to dismantle their own organizations amid earnings downgrades. It wasn't just to domestic markets but included those abroad as the Ghosn link to Nissan or Mitsubishi landed the director in jail.

The hedge funds here and abroad were again broadly controlled and traded as if primitive cartels. Bundle pacs of enormously complex organizations were brought together under that type legal allowance under varied price or output policies leveraged by the bank access and almost guaranteed security enforcing of federal agencies complicit to that era. They likely didn't realize what was going on but It became clear when they were forced to cohabitation with traditional foes. Security organs left the support role and turned on the bankers and by extension the hedge funds.

The Russians and British and their domestic allies as entertainer or special interest groups tied to the media were ousted in a process still playing out over to Langley. They had extensive mid range capacity to support the New York theft and congressional committee support but by nature or application tested low to security function and the others are slowly being dealt with. Feral law is now filling the security vacuum linked to that type rigging which served only to funnel control and funds to the private sector managers of previous eras. They just went too far and the system became painfully exposed as an avoidable fraud. Politics remain supportive of the now gutted Nee York group but that likely won't last nor the media pillar that links it.

The 2008 era of hedge fund ownership was witnessed by a series of Ò hostile takeovers' or corporate mergers that weren't approved by the targeted or bought out groups governing board of directors. A 'friendly' takeover is mutual board accord to the buyer and bought out industry and stock ownership reflects it. In a hostile one the stockholders are either bought out by elevated value or possibly coerced even by threat or injury. In the 8-year span from Dodd Frank passage to repeal hostile takeovers were common and again the hedge funds reflected the cartel pricing of trade blocs with price and output controls not reflecting optimal consumer demand in conventional supply and demand equilibriums. To practice that presumes a free flow or resources brokered by prices. Any type of merger was possible in that era and the goods quality started to reflect the minimal market interest of the owner who just wanted the guaranteed earnings not market share. The varied industries stalled and yields dropped off while real producers were forced out of the markets for lack of funding or ability to consumers.

The hedge funds themselves to the era were also very unique, as they would include mergers of relatively equal organizations as telecommunication, energy or transportation groups that had conventionally competed to other time frames when the collusion hadn't been possible. The economists or financiers differentiate between Ò horizontal mergers of that type and more conventional purchasing of sub units that directly contribute to their output. Immersion within the same industry. For example a car manufacturer could buy a separate parts company and have it become a subsidiary. That type of merger was fairly routine and known as a vertical one and will likely continue.

The merger of larger enterprises won't be easy without an external broker and foreign ones have to be closely watched as well given their effect with cash infusions and resultant subsidy effect. It amounts to market collusion and as a broad rule large enterprises can buy out small and medium ones for their internal savings or external asset access for merger or production needs and not the other way around. The large to large enterprise purchases without government leverage is rare and that suspect to antitrust interests,

Antitrust legislation itself was also an attempt to thwart monopoly prices or distribution starting to the United States with the Sherman Antitrust act of 1890. The law appeared closer linked to distribution control concerns tied to railroad freight supply affect on market distribution or production material access than the price collusion that could have been board controlled. Rails were strongly subsidized then and that broker redress might have dissuaded the freight controls that could have manipulated those markets. Subsequent acts as the Clayton Antitrust Law of 1914 seemed closer linked to banking concerns as J.P. Morgan was singled out even then as a market control problem. The Federal Trade Commission was established that year to guard against consumer fraud as well as price collusion but cartel and monopoly were not clearly defined to redress.

A simple understanding that can be tracked for legal resolve is an external broker control role of a government means by cash or security coercion foreign or domestic that alters the consumer demand or supply price of a free market. A corporation would almost always take on a project for profit yield and monopoly pricing generally results in output loss that leads to new entrants at lower prices if they aren't blocked. If they're foreign and production remains of mostly domestic inputs to produce as well as the market serving domestic demand they'd probably be tolerated or even welcomed by host planners. It's a perception and utility role of the external interest. A private sector one involves personal risk to the investor; a government subsidy involves a pooled one to the planning official often at low personal commitment but potentially high cost as losses can be covered by other funding arrangements.

The main issue worth addressing is firms have to compete to guarantee optimal effort in meeting consumer interests or demand. It's just a force of nature and a predictable one, suppliers opt for the highest price of a good or service and consumers will buy the less expensive one of same type if allowed. A multi-billion dollar ownership deal of even five years ago now stand in the tens of millions reflecting their actual values to producers and consumers without the hedge funds or bank coercion and cartel pricing. That should prove the path forward unless artificial controls channel money and influence divorced from investors and consumers.